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Summary 
This thesis is devoted to integration of online sales into selective distribution 
system. Particularly, it evaluates regulatory documents, case law and doctrinal studies 
concerning online sales in order to make a prospective analysis of future development 
of online distribution and its coherence with selective distribution aims and realities. 
The world has changed significantly due to development of technologies and 
Internet. The first Block Exemption Regulation and the accompanying Guidelines 
adopted in 1999-2000 did not provide sufficient regulatory basis to control online 
sales. Their amendment in 2010 in fact meant the beginning of the new age for 
vertical agreements in the European Union. Together with the relevant case law they 
serve as guidelines for manufacturers in organizing their selling networks. 
However, the law can never satisfy everybody’s interests. While the European 
Commission fights the European market partitioning, manufacturers using exclusive 
and selective distribution and other vertical restrains do not seem ready to introduce 
their products into the one-click distribution channel. The new provisions on online 
sales due to their controversial nature were seriously disapproved at their draft stage 
from the side of the companies owning luxury brands and most of law firms. 
Unfortunately, there exists no case law yet to assess the new rules in practice. The 
Pierre Fabre case decided on the basis of the old regulatory documents demonstrates 
both the producers’ need to protect the image and the quality of their goods and the 
Commission’s and the European Court of Justice’s motivation to establish the single 
market. This opposition is likely to remain in the nearest future. 
Therefore, a compromise decision shall be found in order to balance interests 
of producers, distributors and consumers taking into consideration political aspects. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
The European Competition Law besides the objective to maintain an efficient 
competition as such has always been aiming to create the single market integrating all 
the Member States. Thus, vertical restrains had been regarded as an impediment to 
this supreme aim until the very end of 20th century, when the Commission was 
heavily criticised for ignoring possible pro-competitive character of vertical restrains. 
Thus, in 1997 the Commission issued the Green Paper declaring a new 
approach towards vertical restrains. As a result, Regulation No 2790/19991 and the 
accompanying Guidelines 2  provided a new more economic based approach in 
assessing effects of vertical restrains on competition. However, in spite of such a big 
step forward these documents lost their relevancy very soon after their adoption. 
The reason of their falling behind is the fast development of the Internet and 
online shops. Internet distribution has appeared as a separate distribution channel and 
has attracted many market players. At the same time, the Commission has recognised 
an integrative power of online sales; therefore, the Internet has become an important 
instrument for new markets penetration. 
Before the expiry of Regulation No 2790/1999 and its Guidelines the 
Commission issued the Draft Regulation3 and the Draft Guidelines4 and opened 
public consultations. Plenty of documents were submitted before the Commission for 
                                                
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (“Regulation No 
2790/1999) [1999] OJ L 336/21 
2  Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C 291 (“the old 
Guidelines”) 
3 Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of vertical agreements and concerted practices (“Draft Regulation”) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/draft_regulation_en.
pdf> 
4 Draft Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“Draft Guidelines”) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/draft_notice_en.pdf> 
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the analysis. Finally, it adopted the new Block Exemption Regulation5 and the 
accompanying Guidelines6 in 2010. 
The new documents contain many provisions on online sales, which 
interpretation is rather controversial, especially in the context of selective distribution. 
As follows from the comments to the Pierre Fabre case7 – the only existing judgement 
on online sales on the European Union level, manufacturers of luxury goods and high-
quality products may disfavour the established rules on Internet selling and argue for 
its detrimental effect on some products. 
Future development of the case law will demonstrate whether the 
Commission’s approach towards online sales is too strict, like it was with the vertical 
restrains, or the Commission follows the right direction. 
1.2 Purpose 
The thesis aims to examine the relevant documents, such as the VBER and the 
Guidelines, as well as the relevant case law in order to reveal the existing status of 
online sales, particularly in the context of selective distribution, its benefits, 
drawbacks and possible development. The questions to answer are if the current 
regime is appropriate for effective competition and if there could be more reasonable 
solutions in terms of consumer welfare. 
1.3 Method 
The method chosen for this paper is a traditional legal dogmatic method. The 
traditional method includes describing and systematic analysis of the applicable 
legislation, case law, doctrinal studies and research articles. The outcome of 
traditional method application is to reveal the status of online distribution in 
competition law of the European Union, its virtues and shortcomings and attempt to 
find possible solutions to the existing problems. 
                                                
5 Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices (“ the VBER”) [2010] OJ L102/1 
6  Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C130/1 (“The 
Guidelines”) 
7  Case C-349/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l´Autorité de la 
concurrence [2011] 
 6 
1.4 Material 
The material for this research contains the Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation and the accompanying Guidelines together with their draft versions and 
the relevant case law, such as the Pierre Fabre case and the Decision of French 
Competition Authority on the Bang & Olufsen case8. Doctrinal studies, research 
articles and contributions submitted before the Commission as public consultations 
are also of great value for the thesis. 
1.5 Delimitation 
This thesis covers the key issues on compatibility of the new online sales 
regime with the well-establish principles of selective distribution. The main problems 
of interest concern safeguarding of brand image and other inherent features of 
selective distribution, such as a need to offer professional advice and to ensure the 
products’ proper usage, when operating online distribution channel. Possible 
detrimental influence of Internet selling on producers of luxury and high-quality 
goods is emphasised. 
1.6 Outline 
The thesis consists of five chapters, where two of them are introduction and 
conclusion. The second chapter describes the theoretical aspects of online sales, 
especially in combination with selective distribution. The third chapter contains the 
analysis of the current regulatory basis of online sales; its comparison with the 
provisions offered in draft documents and describes possible consequences of such 
regime in practice. The fourth chapter examines the relevant case law and discusses 
its positive and negative issues.   
                                                
8 République Franćais Autorité de la concurrence, The Autorité de la concurrence fines Bang 
& Olufsen for prohibiting its approved distributors from selling its products online, Press 
releases 2012, English version 
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=418&id_article=2009> 
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2 Online Sales as Distribution Channel 
In recent decades the Internet has developed dramatically and therefore the 
substantial share of commerce has expanded to the online space, which has become a 
significant part of everyday life. As a separate distribution channel Internet selling has 
its own peculiarities that influence competition in a specific way. 
Before looking deeply into main features of online distribution and its legal 
regulation, it is worth explaining the position, from which all the following findings 
will be assessed, namely, whose benefits competition law aims to ensure. 
Legal doctrine considers two main concepts as the aims of the EU 
competition law – consumer welfare and total welfare. Consumer welfare constitutes 
consumer surplus, however, it is not limited to the price, but also includes quality, 
range and service related to the price9. Consumer welfare can also be found in 
creating of incentives for manufacturers to innovations and inventions. Total welfare 
consists of consumer and manufacturer surplus. In other words, total welfare is 
economic efficiency, providing maximizing of consumer welfare and optimal 
allocation of resources10. 
Nevertheless, the concept of total welfare is rather controversial and is often 
criticised for difficulties in practical implication and finding total welfare standard. 
Thus, competition authorities do not seem to adhere to it. The case law interpretation 
of the competition rules supports such position. Article 101(3) TFEU provides a 
possibility for an agreement to be exempted inter alia given it allows consumers fair 
share of the resulting benefit; and the European Court of Justice has recently 
confirmed that principle11. Alternatively, competition rules and the case law do not 
contain any lead to manufacturers’ welfare.  
                                                
9 Pieter Kalbfleisch, Aiming for Alliance: Competition Law and Consumer Welfare, Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 111 
10 Paul Craig and Gránnie de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, 5th Edition, 
Oxford New York : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 959 
11  Case C-501/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] ECR I-9291 
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As follows from the aforementioned considerations, the concept of consumer 
welfare is prevalent and is used to decide competition cases, thus, it will be also 
adhered to in this thesis. 
2.1 General Considerations 
2.1.1 Encouraging Competition 
As the efforts and sunk costs of establishing an online outlet are considerably 
lower than those for brick and mortar shops, the number of Internet resellers is 
constantly growing, thus, facilitating competition on the market. 
Mostly it concerns intra-brand price competition. Internet transparency 
allows customers searching for better deals; therefore, price has become the decisive 
factor for a purchase. Nevertheless, non-price incentives are still high, since besides 
competing with each other online distributors have to compete with retailers operating 
physical outlets. The large number of competitors on the market consequently leads to 
improving of purchase terms and conditions and lower prices. 
The same argumentation remains valid also for inter-brand competition. In 
fact, the Internet is merely a new space for distributing goods; hence, it is subject to 
relatively similar fair trade rules. Furthermore, in case many producers apply similar 
restrictions on online sales, this could cause cumulative effects, resulting in distortion 
of competition. Subsequently, such collusive practice might lead to maintaining 
artificially high prices and limited consumer choice in online stores12. 
2.1.2 Consumers’ Benefits 
Along with lower prices, convenience of online shopping is the most 
valuable aspect for many consumers. 
The obvious advantage is a fast access to a large variety of stores in different 
countries. Despite online market fragmentation is still high13, some products are 
                                                
12  Viktoria H.S.E. Roberston. Online sales under the European Commission´s Block 
Exemption Regulation on vertical agreements: Part 1, European Competition Law Review 
2012, 33(3), pp. 132- 137. 
13  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Cross-
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available only in foreign online outlets, thus, the consumer can spend several minutes 
to buy a product via the Internet, which otherwise could be purchased only while 
visiting a particular state. Some online distributors offer a pre-order of goods not 
available at the moment, which is not typical for physical outlets. 
Transparency of Internet shops appears very significant for consumers’ 
choice. Firstly, customers can easily get almost all information about the product they 
are interested in and even take a look at other customers’ feedbacks. The price 
transparency is of special value, since it allows consumers making better-informed 
choices and, hence, saving money. It is worth noticing that there exists a great amount 
of price-compare sites, which are able to compare not only prices, but also delivery 
costs and find the cheapest options. 
The last point on online shopping convenience to present here is that 
“consumers should have the choice”14. This actually means that customers shall be 
free to decide on their own if they want to enjoy services of brick and mortar shops 
and, consequently, pay for them while paying for the product, or make a purchase 
online without such assistance yet at a lower price. However, customers could enjoy 
both services and low price, as it will be discussed further. 
2.1.3 Single Market 
Internet selling is perfectly suitable for development of the single market in 
the European Union. Unlimited access to the site from anywhere and developed postal 
and delivery services allow every online shop trading all over the European Union. 
However, there exist practical impediments for Union-dimension sales. As it has been 
stated in the Commission’s report15 there are many reasons why online market 
remains fragmented. In particular, they are connected with customers’ perception 
issues and lack of trust to online shops established in other Member States. While the 
                                                                                                                                      
Border Business to Consumer E-commerce in the EU, COM(2009) 557 final < 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/COM_2009_0557_4_en.pdf> 
14 D. Waelbroeck, Partner Ashurst LLP, Internet Distribution and Vertical Restraints < 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/conferences/verticals/UCL_verticals_03_waelbroeck.pdf> 
15 Commission Staff Working Document, Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU, 
SEC(2009) 283 final 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/com_staff_wp2009_en.pdf> 
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Commission can hardly control consumers’ preferences, it absolutely can take care of 
eliminating certain restrains on Internet selling, like it was done in 2010.  
2.2 ‘Selective’ Concerns 
Online sales freedom is detrimental for manufacturers of certain products. 
While some producers aim to get rid of goods and to gain profit from every sold item, 
others have to care about prestigious image of their products as well. 
2.2.1 Matching Problem  
Complicated nature of some products and a need in professional advice may 
undermine sales of such products through the Internet. In case of luxury goods, the 
distribution channel shall be able to provide customers with ‘product matching’ 
services16. In physical outlets customers can try out the product in real light, feel its 
texture, compare the match with their image and also get individual advice. Physical 
proximity and a feedback provided by sales personnel is essential for some types of 
goods, thus, their availability in online stores might cause the problem of ‘bad 
experience’. ‘Bad experience’ occurs when a person who has bought an unsuitable 
product may never buy goods of this brand again, even though his or her ‘perfect 
product’ is available in the product line, thus, the ‘bad experience’ of one product will 
be attributed to the brand as whole17. 
On the other hand, not every type of products sold via selective distribution 
system experiences matching problem when selling online. Regarding computers, 
mobile phones, household appliances and other devices it should be noticed that it is 
even easier to find an appropriate product using Internet. Products’ appearance and 
tactile perception are less important in this case. These products can be compared on 
the basis of objective characteristics and matched with actual customers’ needs. 
Therefore, online distribution is beneficial for such products. 
                                                
16 Cristina Caffarra, An Economic Report for Chanel, Selective Distribution of Luxury Goods 
in the Age of E-Commerce, (2008), p. 16 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_online_commerce/chanel_report.pdf> 
17Ibid., p. 18 
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Nevertheless, online sales can be beneficial regardless of the type of goods. It 
happens given the product is bought by a repeat purchaser18. Repeat purchasers got 
advice in the past; hence, they cannot face a matching problem when shopping online. 
Apparently, online stores shall not discriminate against non-experienced customers; 
thus, this idea unfortunately cannot be implemented in practice. 
2.2.2 Free Riding 
At the end of the day, the most significant detrimental effect of Internet sales 
is free riding. 
While some dealers reach lower prices and, thus, bigger demand via parallel 
imports into some state, and consequently, free ride only on official shops in this 
particular area, online stores with low prices potentially free ride on every authorised 
shop in all the states where they deliver to. Considering difference in standards of 
price and distribution costs in different countries, such practice could dramatically 
damage brick and mortar distributors. Online shops are limited in the ability to 
provide their own matching services and consequently they free ride on the services 
provided in brick and mortar outlets. Customers could try out a product and get 
consultation in a physical outlet and finally buy a product from an online shop, 
enjoying low retail price. As a result, a physical retailer’s efforts are not paid for and 
an online reseller gets a customer and hence profit. 
Theoretically the problem could be resolved if dealers charged for pre-sale 
services separately19. It would allow physical outlets being refunded for services 
provided for the customer even if he or she did not buy the product after being 
consulted. However, practical implication of such scheme is very complicated. 
Customers could pay for a certain period of time when services are provided. Though 
there is no guarantee that a sales employee’s efforts are hard enough to justify the 
payment. The second option could be that the customer pays only when a successful 
‘match’ is found.  In this case, the customer could intentionally refuse appropriate 
products to avoid services payment and then buy the product online. 
                                                
18 Ibid., p. 20 
19 Ibid. 
 12 
Nevertheless, there exists an example of a services fee. Recently Vera Wang 
bridal boutiques in Shanghai have started to charge approximately 500$ for 90-
minutes try-on20. This new policy is aimed to protect intellectual property rights of the 
designer, since Chinese market has many counterfeit producers copying Vera Wang 
dresses. As the fee is deducted from the product price in case of purchase, customers 
who are intended to buy a dress will not spend extra money21. 
2.2.3 Protecting Brand Image 
Producers of luxury and technically sophisticated goods, besides investing in 
quality, also invest into the brand name and aura of luxury. 
Luxury manufacturers’ concerns are mostly connected with the customers' 
perception of online shops. If case they are seen as equal to high-class physical stores, 
online distribution is not to negatively influence the brand image. Alternatively, in 
case online shops are perceived as similar to discount outlets, this undermines the 
prestige of the brand. 
In that consideration, the design of the website is of great importance. Trivial 
site environment and incorrect product presentation, such as inappropriate colours not 
associated with the brand, poor quality photos, insufficient description, etc., might 
destroy aura of luxury ascribed to the brand. Therefore, manufacturers tend to develop 
special ‘Internet sales module’ software22 in order to provide a uniform website image 
for every distributor. 
Taking into account all the said above, it appears extremely important to find a 
balance between interests of producers, distributors, and certainly consumers in order 
to facilitate efficient competition on the market.  
                                                
20  Melanie Lee, Reuters, Vera Wang scraps $500 try-on fee in Shanghai, (2013) 
<http://www.nbcnews.com/business/vera-wang-scraps-500-try-fee-shanghai-2B9101156> 
21 Alexis Lai, Lucrezia Seu, Vera Wang makes fashion faux pas at first China store, (2013) < 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/28/business/china-vera-wang-discrimination> 
22 Caffarra, p. 19 
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3 Recent Changes in Online Sales Regime 
The old Guidelines on Vertical Restrains of 2000 did not contain 
comprehensive provisions on online sales and treated the Internet as the means of 
advertisement rather than selling. The new Guidelines in paragraph 52 explicitly state 
that, "in principle, every distributor must be allowed to use the Internet to sell 
products”.  
The examples of the Internet restrictions provided in the Guidelines and other 
relevant issues are to be discussed below. It is important to mention that during the 
elaboration of the final versions, Commission received 164 documents 23  with 
comments on Draft Regulation and Draft Guidelines. Such contributions help to 
assess a problem from different points of view and will be used in the following 
discussion. 
3.1 Passive Nature of Online Sales 
The Guidelines expressly say that “in general, where a distributor uses website 
to sell products that is considered a form of passive selling, since it is a reasonable 
way to allow customers to reach the distributor”24. Consequently, restrictions on 
online sales imposed by the supplier to its dealers are considered as hardcore 
restrictions and, hence, preclude a safe harbour of the VBER. 
Nevertheless, one can argue the Commission’s approach towards the nature of 
online sales. The current distinction between active and passive sales was useful prior 
to the development of Internet selling. Thus, the main criterion of passive sales is the 
existence of search costs for customers25.  
                                                
23 The European Commission, Review of the competition rules applicable to vertical 
agreements, Public Consultations [webpage], (2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/index.html> 
24 The Guidelines, para 52 
25 European Competition Lawyers Forum (ECLF), Comments on the Draft Block Exemption 
Regulation and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (“European Competition Lawyers 
Contribution”) p. 13 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/europeancompetition
lawyersforum_en.pdf>  
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However, nowadays it is obvious that consumers’ search costs to find the site 
of the local retailer or the site from abroad are not different. Moreover, customers are 
not aware of such distinction and do not aim to become a part of passive sales 
mechanism. Development of Internet shops has encouraged invention of price-
compare sites and third party platforms that collect information on available goods. 
Typing the name of the product customers are interested in, they do not care from 
which part of the European Union they will get the item as long as the price and 
conditions are reasonable. In this regard, the Commission’s statement that “offering 
different language options on the websites does not, of itself, change the passive 
character of selling” becomes undermined. In practice search engines find the relevant 
sites by matching the information typed by the user and the content of sites, 
subsequently, the spelling and the language of the site are of significant importance. 
In abstract from such details it is worth saying that the Commission’s 
approach is rather inconsequent. It tries to be progressive and draws a lot of attention 
to the Internet as to “a powerful tool to reach a great number and variety of customers 
than by more traditional sales methods”26. However, the Commission does not 
consider online space as parallel to the real one, but more as complementary. 
Apparently such complementary nature has lead to the passive character of online 
sales. On the other hand, if Internet distribution channels and offline channels are 
parallel to each other, they must be supported by equal regulatory policy and, 
furthermore, with the policy on their interaction. Considering online sales within 
selective distribution, “it is simply another distribution channel and suppliers should 
be free to put restrictions and qualitative criteria on online distributors that achieve the 
same objectives as with brick and mortar distribution”27.  
Moreover, it appears that the Commission while considering online sales as 
passive sales implicitly admits that operation of an Internet shop may constitute the 
main activity of the distributor. Thus, as a ‘bonus’ to selective distribution according 
to the Guidelines28 the supplier may require distributors to have at least one brick and 
                                                
26 The Guidelines, para 52  
27  A S Watson Europe, Response to the Commission's review of the Block Exemption 
Regulation and Guidelines on vertical restraints, p. 7< 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/aswatson_en.pdf>  
28 The Guidelines, para 54 
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mortar shop. In this respect the useful example is provided in one of the contributions 
submitted before the Commission29. Thus, the dealer of luxury goods could operate a 
small brick and mortar shop, for instance, in Malta, while distributing the goods via 
the Internet all over the European Union. Is it still true that its small shop in Malta is 
the active sales point and the EU-delivery online store is an additional passive 
business? One more example could be distributing of the software, computer games, 
music and movies through the Internet, particularly via such platforms as App Store, 
iTunes, Google Play, Marketplace, Amazon, Spotify, Steam etc. Obviously due to the 
digital nature of some products it makes almost no sense to buy them from offline 
shops. The same question arises – is it still ‘passive distribution’ – and the answer 
seems to be totally opposite to the Commission’s view. 
As it has been mentioned above the Commission is interested in development 
of the single market. Internet sales as “a powerful tool to reach a great number and 
variety of customers” shall encourage such development. This may be the reason why 
the Commission protects online sales so carefully. Having given them the notion of 
‘passive sales’, the Commission, therefore safeguards online sales from vertical 
restrains, since general prohibition of passive sales is the hardcore restriction under 
the VBER. However, the development of the single market through the system of 
passive sales seems to be a logical mistake in this complex idea. 
3.2 New Hardcore Restrictions 
3.2.1 Website Re-routing 
The first example of the hardcore restrictions on passive selling is preventing 
customers located in another territory from viewing the distributor’s website or 
automatically re-routing customers from this site to manufacturer’s or other 
distributors’ websites. 30  Having appeared in the Draft Guidelines without any 
additional explanations this clause was argued in the contributions submitted before 
                                                
29 Clifford Chance LLP, Response of Clifford Chance LLP to the European Commission’s 
Consultation on the Review of the Competition Rules Applicable to Vertical Agreements, 
(“Clifford Chance LLP Contribution”), p. 7 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/cliffordchance_en.pd
f>  
30 The Guidelines, para 52 
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the Commission. In particular, it is discussed that re-routing does not aim to partition 
the market, though to be sure that customers are provided with the sufficient level of 
services. 
The main argument is that the customers shall be advised in the language that 
is intelligible to them. The example provided is that if the user intents to buy a hair 
colorant, which might cause allergic reaction, he or she must be informed of that31. 
Furthermore, automatic re-routing does not prevent the customer from buying the 
product from the initial website he is visiting or any website he wishes, though “the 
supplier must be allowed to ensure he has been properly informed beforehand”32. 
Others insist that re-routing can be beneficial for end-customers in terms of 
consumer protection. Thus, “web re-routing may serve to address legitimate concerns 
regarding disparate legislative systems and trading conditions, but also to minimise 
free-riding risks and to provide for adequate liability structures” 33. At the same time, 
prohibition of re-routing could compromise the efficiency of the distribution network 
structure through eliminating competitive online and offline dealers. However, further 
argumentation has not been provided. 
As it is seen from the Guidelines the Commission has not changed the 
approach. Nevertheless, the initiatives on customer friendliness have been heard, 
because the offer of the relevant links to the manufacturer’s or other distributors’ 
websites is not regarded as hardcore restriction34. The Commission’s decision seems 
very reasonable, since if producers care about the level of services and the language 
of the site, they could offer to visit the other webpages through the pop-up window, 
                                                
31 The European Cosmetics Association Colipa, Comments by Colipa on the Proposed Review 
of Competition Rules for the Distribution Sector, p. 4 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/eucosmeticsassoccoli
pa_en.pdf> 
32  Ashurst LLP, Response to DG Competition’s Draft Revised Block Exemption and 
Guidelines for the Assessment of Vertical Agreements under EC Competition Law, p. 3 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/ashurst_en.pdf>  
33 Estée Lauder Companies, Consultation on The Proposal for a Vertical Restraints Block 
Exemption Regulation and its Guidelines, pp. 21-22 (“Estée Lauder Companies 
Contribution”) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/esteelaudercompanie
s_en.pdf> 
34 The Guidelines, para 52 
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for example. Automatic re-routing appears to be a hard selling practice that is simply 
impolite towards customers. 
3.2.2 Credit Card Data Issue 
The next hardcore restriction is termination of consumers' transactions over 
the Internet once their credit card data reveal an address that is not within the 
distributor's territory35. This novelty was not criticised by its meaning, though the 
current wording is not absolutely clear. 
Nowadays the possibility to pay with the card everywhere means a lot for 
customers and the Internet is not an exception. Free movement of persons as one of 
the main freedoms of the European Union creates situations where people live out of 
the territory where their bankcards are registered. Obviously, such people shall not be 
deprived from online shopping in the region where the online shop delivers to, 
because of the card data. It seems that the Commission’s intention was to cover not 
only credit cards, but also debit cards by such restriction, otherwise, an explanation 
shall be provided. Some customers prefer using paying systems, such as PayPal, 
Moneybookers etc., since they provide high-level data securement. Nevertheless, the 
current wording can hardly be interpreted as to cover paying systems as well. The 
Commission shall take that inaccuracy into account when amending the Guidelines in 
the future. 
3.2.3 Limiting Proportion of Online Sales 
Limiting the proportion of distributors’ overall sales made over the Internet is 
another hardcore restriction. The Guidelines add that this does not preclude the 
supplier from requiring its distributors to sell at least a certain absolute amount (in 
value or volume) of the products offline to ensure an efficient operation of its brick 
and mortar shop. This absolute amount can be the same for all buyers, or determined 
individually for each buyer on the basis of objective criteria, such as the buyer's size 
in the network or its geographic location36. 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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This clause was intensively criticised especially in connection with the 
supplier’s right to require its distributors to have at least one brick and mortar shop37. 
Thus, some authors38 believe that if there is a condition to operate a physical point of 
sale it is consistent to impose a reasonable proportion between online and offline 
sales. Otherwise, distributors could circumvent such requirement by operating a 
‘sham-shop’39 and mostly sell goods online. 
Thus, the most relevant problem for selective distribution is free riding. 
Limiting the proportion of Internet sales will create incentives for dealers to invest 
into offline shops, hence, maintaining retail environment and the level of services that 
are so important for selective distribution. In its contribution Estée Lauder tried to 
draw the Commission’s attention to the problem of free riders in luxury goods 
industry and the need to limit online sales. It stated, particularly, that in case ‘the 
prestige cosmetics and fragrances industry’ is wrong about importance of the current 
issue, the consequences for competition on the market could be not significant, on the 
contrary, if the industry is right about detrimental effect of such provision, the harm 
could be significant in terms of “of lost revenue, jobs, innovation and consumer 
choice and loss irremediable”40. Moreover, the good example is that such practice was 
supported in Germany. The Federal High Court considered that “it is neither 
discriminatory nor unjustified within a selective distribution system to tie supply to 
the condition that at least 50% of all sales must be made through the brick and mortar 
store”41. 
The alternative given by the Commission for effective operation of offline 
shops was not supported. Conversely it was stated that the wording is rather 
ambiguous and demands further explanation. Thus, if it comes to absolute value of 
offline sales, does it refer to the sales from the supplier to the distributor or to the 
retail sales from the distributor to final customers? The latter option might raise retail 
price maintenance issues according to the American Bar Association’s point of 
                                                
37 Ibid., para 54 
38 European Competition Lawyers Contribution, p.18 
39 Ibid., p. 17 
40 Estée Lauder Companies Contribution, p. 24 
41 BGH, Az. KZR 2/02, Depotkosmetik im Internet [2004] DB 311 
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view42.  
In general limiting the proportion of online sales seems to be a more 
reasonable solution. Adjusting the absolute amount of the products to be sold offline 
to the size and location distributors might negatively influence non-discriminatory 
manner of the supplier-distributors relations. Imposing a limit on online sales is “a 
much more efficient, accurate and straightforward way to prevent free-riding”43. 
3.2.4 Dual Pricing 
 The last example of hardcore restrictions provided in the Guidelines is setting 
a higher price for products to be sold by the distributor online than for products to be 
sold offline. The Commission adds that this does not exclude the supplier agreeing 
with the buyer a fixed fee to support the latter's offline or online sales efforts, while 
this fee is not a variable fee, where the sum increases with the realised offline 
turnover as this would amount indirectly to dual pricing44.  
 As it is impartially stated in one of the submissions, the dual pricing strategy 
could be caused by different business and legal factors in different market areas; 
furthermore, “it would also be imprudent for decision makers to intervene in a 
company's pricing policy by actually redistributing the profits in terms of fixed 
fees”45. The decision to use the system of dual pricing may be justified by the fact that 
producers aim to encourage their retailers to invest in brick and mortar shops. Lower 
purchase price allows setting higher retail margin and, hence, higher profit earning. 
Difference in prices could be affected by objective findings, such as average 
additional expenses for maintaining physical sales environment and services, average 
additional costs for rent, personnel training etc. 
                                                
42 American Bar Association, Joint Comments of the American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law and Section of International Law on the Proposal of the European Commission 
for a Revised Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines in Supply and Distribution 
Agreements, p. 13 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/americanbarassociati
on_en.pdf> 
43 Clifford Chance LLP Contribution, p. 8 
44 The Guidelines, para 52 
45 Estée Lauder Companies Contribution, p. 27 
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The fixed fee is not able to serve the same goal, since it ignores that 
distribution costs differ depending on the volume of goods sold. Therefore, the 
distribution channel concerned can be compensated more efficiently and accurately 
by differential pricing policy, while fixed fees “do not make commercial sense to 
drive the investment sought”46. 
Having heard the public opinion, the Commission has added one more clause 
on dual pricing47. It explicitly states that the agreement containing dual pricing 
provision may satisfy conditions of article 101(3) TFEU48 and, thus, be exempted. In 
this case, the burden of proof would be on the manufacturer. 
3.3 Acceptable Restrictions 
3.3.1 Restrictions on Active Sales 
Despite the general concept an attempt to show the possibly active character 
of online sales was made in the Draft Guidelines. Having presented the issue that 
online selling may be considered as active sales when it is specifically targeted to 
certain customers49, the Commission has developed this idea further stating relevant 
examples50. Thus, territory-based banners constitute the form of active selling on the 
territories where they are shown. Paying to search engines or advertisement providers 
to reach customers on a certain territory is regarded as active sales as well. Therefore, 
the supplier is free to prohibit such activity. 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that when customers search for something 
in the Internet, the high rated sites would be shown only if their content to some 
extent is compatible with the user’s request. At the same time the content of territory-
based banners mostly depends on the previous requests of the user. Thus, such 
advertisement is contextual and predetermined by customers themselves. 
                                                
46  Baker & McKenzie, Vertical Restrains – Response to Consultation, p. 7 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/bakermckenzie_en.p
df> 
47 The Guidelines, para 64 
48 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115/47, art. 101(3) 
49 Draft Guidelines, para 53 
50 The Guidelines, para 53 
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Subsequently, this undermines the examples given by the Commission and even more 
blurs the boundaries between active and passive online sales. 
However, this provision seems to be the first step for online sales to become 
equal to offline distribution. In the meantime, producers at least have the possibility to 
restrict advertisement activities of their distributors. 
3.3.2 Brick and Mortar Requirement 
As it has been mentioned above the Guidelines allow producers requiring its 
distributors to operate one or more brick and mortar shops or showrooms as a 
condition to be authorised dealers within a selective distribution system. The views on 
this novelty vary significantly. 
On one hand, brick and mortar clause appears to be inconsistent with the 
Commission’s objectives. While emphasising the importance of market integration 
and treating the Internet sales as a new dynamic and innovative level of distribution, 
the Guidelines permit such barriers to entry the distribution system. It is certainly not 
an obligation for suppliers to require a physical outlet, though the majority will prefer 
to include this clause in the criteria, thus, foreclosing some distributors51. 
There for sure exist certain distributors who meet all the producer’s criteria, 
excepting the brick and mortar one. However, it does not necessarily mean that they 
are potential free riders. Firstly, pure players have to invest in their virtual shops as 
well as physical retailers. Web-design, structure of the website, updating content, 
integration of paying systems according to data safety requirements, driving traffic, 
providing online consultations, establishing logistics system and many other demand 
financial, time and human recourses. Moreover, some studies reveal the other side of 
free-riding problem52. Easy access to and user-friendly environment of the online-
shop allow customers to get all the information they are interested in, including 
approximate price, and then make a purchase from a brick and mortar shop, because 
they might need the product immediately. It is absolutely true that some customers 
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would prefer to be consulted by the webpage than by shop assistants. Hence, in this 
case physical shops free ride on pure players.  
On the other hand, dominance of online distribution may distort incentives of 
retailers to invest in brick and mortar shops and negatively influence the value of 
customer services up to their elimination. If customers manage shopping online 
without technical advice, product demonstration and possibly after-sales services, 
would it be any sense to invest in them? The brick and mortar requirement is a chance 
to safeguard ‘aura of luxury’ that is so important for producers. 
However, the effect from brick and mortar requirement is significantly 
undermined by prohibition to combine selective and exclusive distribution systems53. 
The Guidelines say that authorised dealers may be prevented from retailing from 
different premises or from opening a new outlet in a different location. However, 
launching website is not considered as opening the new outlet, therefore, the supplier 
is not entitled to impose territorial restrictions on the online store activity. This 
apparently might result in ‘Malta example’, where the distributor has one small 
physical shop in Malta and the Internet store with delivery all over the European 
Union. 
In this consideration, the solution could be to require the distributors to have a 
brick and mortar shop in every state, where their online shop operates. This seems 
reasonable and fair, since in that regard online distributors would not free ride on 
someone else’s investments in a certain area, but would contribute into reputation as 
well. At the same time, it is quite clear that the Commission will never impede market 
integration in such way for the benefit of luxury goods industry. 
3.3.3 Quality Standards 
 According to the Guidelines the manufacturer is entitled to require quality 
standards to use the Internet site to resell its goods54. These standards or criteria, 
however, must be overall equivalent to the criteria imposed for the sales from 
physical outlets. Otherwise, imposing stricter requirements for authorised retailers, 
which dissuade them from using the Internet, is regarded as a hardcore restriction and, 
                                                
53 The Guidelines, para 57 
54 Ibid., para 54 
 23 
therefore, prohibited. It should be noticed that criteria must not be identical, though 
rather pursue the same objectives and achieve comparable results, while difference in 
criteria must be justified by peculiarities of online and offline retailing respectively. 
 When reading this novelty, one might feel that even the Commission is not 
sure that it is possible to elaborate equivalent criteria for operation of brick and mortar 
and Internet shops. There are a lot of specific issues that need absolutely different 
approaches depending if products are sold online or offline, for instance, after-sale 
services, faulty product problem, security requirements for payments etc. Instead of 
discussing real-life examples that could occur, it shall be emphasised how the 
Commission treats the possible non-equivalence of standards. It basically states that 
dissuading distributors by imposing non-equivalent criteria is a hardcore restriction, 
thus, this precludes the benefit from the VBER. In the meantime, in order to be still 
exempted the supplier must prove that the offline and online criteria pursue the same 
objective and their results are comparable. Furthermore, the difference in standards 
must be justified by the nature of the distribution modes. As a result, if the 
Commission finds the criteria non-equivalent, the supplier would bear significant 
burden of proof to show that it does not dissuade distributors referring to such vague 
and estimative terms as ‘same objectives’, ‘comparable results’ and ‘distribution 
mode nature’. 
 Unfortunately, while granting a right to require quality standards for online 
stores, which is, by the way, obviously the main sense of selective distribution, the 
Commission has created a new hardcore restriction. This amendment appears to be 
overly harsh, since “hardcore restrictions must be limited to the most serious 
distortions of competition”55. 
3.3.4 Third Party Platforms 
According to the Guidelines the supplier may require its distributors to use 
third party platforms only in accordance with conditions and standards agreed. The 
current provision was not included into the Draft Guidelines and, therefore, was not 
discussed in the submissions. 
                                                
55 European Competition Lawyers Contribution, p. 20 
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After the adoption of the Guidelines the wording of this provision was 
criticised56. Obviously, the clause states that suppliers can impose requirements on the 
use of third party platforms; however, its indirect meaning is that distributors are free 
to choose third party platforms for operating online stores without the suppliers’ 
consent. The European Luxury Coalition believes that such practice might be 
detrimental for selective distribution. In particular, the distributor could disclose 
confidential commercial information to a third party, such as “the stocking, logistics 
and marketing of products, as well as any customer relationship management”57. In 
this regard a third party involvement must be minimised only to technical support of 
the site. 
 
  
                                                
56 Observations of the European Luxury Coalition, including Comité Colbert, Altagamma, 
Walpole and the Spanish Luxury Forum, on the final draft of the Commission’s Block 
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http://www.eccia.eu/uploads/media/Revision_of_the_Vertical_Restraints_Block_Exemption.
pdf> 
57 Ibid. 
 25 
4 Pierre Fabre Landmark 
The only case that could be helpful for understanding of the current policy 
towards Internet sales in practice is the judgement of the European Court of Justice on 
Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique distribution system58. Despite the case was decided 
in accordance with the old Regulation No 2790/1999, its argumentation remains in 
line with the VBER. 
4.1 Procedure before the Court 
4.1.1 Factual Background 
Pierre Fabre (a member of Pierre Fabre group) is a company that manufactures 
and sells cosmetics and personal care products. These products are not classified as 
medicines and, hence, are not covered by the pharmacists’ monopoly. The market 
share of Pierre Fabre group on the French market for those products is approximately 
20%. 
Pierre Fabre uses selective distribution system to sell its goods. The clause, 
which had drawn the interest of the French Competition Authority, was the 
requirement for authorised dealers that “sales must be made exclusively in a physical 
space, in which a qualified pharmacist must be present”59. The Competition Authority 
considered that such requirement excludes de facto all forms of selling online and 
ruled that Pierre Fabre must amend the existing distribution agreements in order to 
enable the retailers to sell via the Internet. 
The decision was contested by Pierre Fabre and, finally, reached the ECJ with 
the question for a preliminary ruling: “Does a general and absolute ban on selling 
contract goods to end-users via the internet, imposed on authorised distributors in the 
context of a selective distribution network, in fact constitute a ‘hardcore’ restriction of 
competition by object for the purposes of Article 81(1) EC [Article 101(1) TFEU] 
which is not covered by the block exemption provided for by Regulation No 
                                                
58 C-349/09 
59 Ibid., para 12 
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2790/1999 but which is potentially eligible for an individual exemption under 
Article 81(3) EC [Article 101(3) TFEU][?]”60. 
4.1.2 ECJ Findings 
 The ECJ started its analysis by refusing the concept of ‘hardcore restriction’, 
since neither article 101 TFEU nor Regulation No 2790/1999 referred to it. Thus, the 
objective was to determine if a ban on online sales constitutes a restriction of 
competition by object. 
 The Court stated that where the anticompetitive object of the agreement is 
established it is not necessary to examine its effect on competition, however, 
according to the case law61, “regard must be had to the content of the clause, the 
objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context of which it forms a 
part”62. 
 The ECJ supported the referring court finding that the requirement that a 
qualified pharmacist must be present at physical outlets de facto prohibits dealers to 
sell goods online. Therefore, it is liable to restrict competition in cosmetics and 
personal care products sector, since it reduces the ability of official retailers to sell 
products outside their territory by excluding the method of selling, which does not 
require physical movement of customers. 
 Referring to the AEG-Telefunken v. Commission judgement63, the Court 
assumed that despite selective distribution agreements necessarily affect price 
competition on the market, they may facilitate competition relating to other factors 
than price and, therefore, be compatible with article 101(1) TFEU. Mentioning the 
landmark decisions on selective distribution64, the ECJ emphasised that to be in 
conformity with EU competition law, members of such networks must be chosen “on 
the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, laid down uniformly for all 
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potential resellers and not applied in a discriminatory fashion” 65 . Also the 
characteristics of goods must necessitate selective distribution in order to preserve 
their quality and ensure their proper use and, in the meantime, selective criteria must 
not go beyond what is necessary. The ECJ stated that Pierre Fabre undoubtedly 
observed the first rule, but added that the legitimate aim and proportionality of the 
restrictions must be determined. 
Pierre Fabre presented two main arguments to justify its ban on Internet sales. 
Firstly, professional advice of qualified pharmacists improves the level of services 
customers enjoy and allow to find a product, which matches a customer best due to 
direct observation of his or her skin, hair and scalp. In other words, the condition at 
issue is justified by public health reasons. Thus, online selling lacks this advantage 
and consumers might buy products that are detrimental for them. Moreover, such 
requirement reduces risks of counterfeiting and free riding in derma-cosmetics 
industry. The second argument is the need to maintain a prestigious image of the 
brands concerned. Pierre Fabre referred to the Copad v. Dior judgement66 citing that 
selling products from online stores (or discount stores, which are of issue in the case) 
“damages the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an aura of luxury”. 
Relying on its case law 67  the ECJ stated that, when it comes to non-
prescription medicine, the arguments relating to personal advising and protection 
against inappropriate use of products cannot be accepted. Regarding the second Pierre 
Fabre’s argument the Court just noted that, “the aim of maintaining a prestigious 
image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition”68 without any further 
explanation. 
Finally, the ECJ came to the conclusion that the clause at issue constitutes a 
restriction of competition by object. 
The second part of the judgement concerns the possibility of block exemption 
or individual exemption under article 101(3) TFEU. In this regard Pierre Fabre 
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claimed that, “the ban on selling the contractual products via the internet is equivalent 
however to a prohibition on operating out of authorised place of establishment”, that 
is permitted under Regulation No 2790/1999. Nevertheless, the Court interpreted ‘a 
place of establishment’ as only an outlet where direct sales take place. 
As a result, according to the ECJ, a ban on Internet sales at the very least has 
as its object the restriction of passive sales to final customers, who cannot purchase 
the product in brick and mortar shop and wish to buy it online. Thus, the agreement 
containing such clause cannot benefit from the block exemption. However, it still can 
satisfy the conditions of article 101(3) TFEU and be exempted on an individual basis. 
4.1.3 Advocate General Findings 
Comparing to the judgement itself the opinion of Advocate General Jan 
Mazák contains more profound analysis of the case. The most important issues and 
ideas are to be presented below. 
The first thing to mention is the French Government’s consideration on 
anticompetitive nature of the clause at issue. While, on one hand, the French 
Government assumed that the ban on Internet sales may be regarded as a restriction 
by object, on the other, it is necessary to assess its positive and negative effects on 
competition, since “there is currently inadequate experience on whether the ban in 
question has by its very nature the object of restricting competition”69. Thus, the ban 
could contribute into enhancing brand image and luxury status of the product, hence, 
facilitating inter-brand competition. 
The next issue concerns the concept of objective justification and its 
interpretation. According to the French Competition Authority the objective 
justification concept can be applied only in two instances. Firstly, it is possible to 
justify a restriction, where such practice derives directly from national or EU law and 
aims to protect public sphere; secondly, in exceptional cases, where the agreement 
objectively necessitates the practice to exist. In other words, this narrow interpretation 
only allows justifying restrictions independent from the undertaking’s commercial 
choices. In the Commission’s view, “undertakings may not in principle replace the 
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competent public authorities in establishing and enforcing the requirements 
concerning the safety of products and the protection of public health”70. Therefore, 
Pierre Fabre’s arguments on the correct use of personal care products and public 
health and safety claims are objectively unfounded. 
Advocate General Mazák pointed out that he would not exclude the possibility 
that private voluntary measures setting ban on online sales could be objectively 
justified due to the nature of the goods concerned or customers to whom they are sold, 
in exceptional circumstances. He added, that in his view, “the legitimate objective 
sought must be of public law nature and therefore aimed at protecting a public 
good”71. 
The last thing here to emphasise is the context of selective distribution. 
Despite the Advocate General’s analysis had the same conclusion that the Court came 
to, it treats the ban on Internet sales as just one of the conditions of Pierre Fabre’s 
selective distribution system, rather than a threat to market integration. Thus, in 
Advocate General’s view, the products of Pierre Fabre were appropriate for using 
selective distribution, and, furthermore, the requirement to have a pharmacist at the 
outlets did not aim to restrict parallel trade, but rather to safeguard the brand name by 
providing high-level services and personal advice to the customers directly and 
immediately at the point of sale. 
Moreover, Advocate General assumed that there could exist exceptional 
circumstances where online sale could undermine the prestigious image and the 
quality of goods, thus, being an objective justification for ban on online sales. In this 
light, the referring court (apparently while examining the possibility of individual 
exemption) should assess whether it is possible to adequately provide all the 
necessary information online and even to advise customers online answering the 
submitted questions. 
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4.2 Case Outcome and Consequences for Online 
Distribution 
 As the first case on Internet selling the Pierre Fabre judgement has been 
actively discussed and criticised. Its perfect compatibility with the new VBER and 
unambiguous message in fact mean the beginning of the Internet age for distribution 
in the European Union. The most disputable and significant issues of the ‘pioneer’ 
ruling will be presented as follows. 
4.2.1 A Clear Message 
 The main outcome of the judgement is a direct answer to the referred question. 
Starting with Pierre Fabre a general and absolute ban on Internet sales constitutes a 
restriction by object. It precludes a safe harbour of the VBER and can be possibly 
exempted only in accordance with article 101(3) TFEU. 
 Analysing the case together with the new VBER and the Guidelines, a total 
prohibition on ban on online sales is compensated to some extent by manufacturers’ 
right to require one or more brick and mortar shop, to impose conditions on online 
stores, which are equivalent to the conditions imposed on physical outlets, and to 
restrict active online promotions, etc. However, it is obvious from the contributions 
submitted before the Commission that luxury producers for sure cannot agree that 
such approach is balanced. 
One more clearly declared idea is that Internet store is not treated as ‘a place 
of establishment’. The Court had to emphasise that, since Regulation No 2790/1999 
and the old Guidelines (2000) did not contain any explanations concerning online 
sales in that respect. However, the Guidelines now stipulate that, “the use by a 
distributor of its own website cannot be considered to be the same thing as the 
opening of a new outlet in a different location”72. 
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4.2.2 Single Market Need 
As it follows from the reports on cross-border e-commerce73 the Commission 
put serious expectations for the Internet for creation of the single market. This policy 
is most likely to be supported by the ECJ. The progressive economic approach, which 
was used successfully for amending the VBER and the Guidelines by the Commission 
and which showed its best in the recent GlaxoSmithKline case74 decided by the ECJ, 
however, did not appear in Pierre Fabre. The Court seemed to adhere to traditional 
formal principles and to a certain degree neglected economic considerations. The 
choice of the approach is crucial for cases, like Pierre Fabre, since no precedents are 
available yet and this first ruling becomes a guideline for the future. 
Using the traditional approach, it is sufficient to establish that a restriction at 
issue is a restriction by object, i.e. prohibited automatically. On the contrary, effects-
based approach treats economic analysis as a dominant decisive factor of the case; 
hence, the effects on the competition must be assessed taking into account the parties’ 
market shares, strength of competition on the market and other relative factors. 
Apparently, the outcome of the case could have been different provided the Court had 
used the economic approach to examine the ban on Internet sales. 
Some authors75 note that the Court, although mentioned that in order to 
establish a restriction by object the economic and legal context of the clause at issue 
must be taken into consideration, failed to follow this point. In this regard, the 
disproportionate manner of the ban on Internet sales established by the Court cannot 
serve an indisputable evidence of a restriction by object. In this particular case the 
Court, probably, did not pay sufficient attention (to the current) market situation. 
Thus, the Pierre Fabre’s market share is only 20%, while its competitors do not 
prohibit their distributors to operate online shops. Intra-brand competition would not 
be reduced significantly, since on the territory of France Pierre Fabre products are 
sold through 23,000 pharmacies76. In the meantime, inter-brand competition on 
cosmetics and personal care products is very strong as well due to a large number of 
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manufacturers and also due to the fact that most of the products with the same status 
on the market as Pierre Fabre products are sold by the same distributors, in particular 
pharmacies, offline and online. Summing up, the effect of the Pierre Fabre’s ban 
might not have been such detrimental as to constitute a restriction on competition. It 
goes without saying that the brief description of the market situation presented above 
cannot provide a sufficient reasoning to decide a case. However, it would have been 
helpful if the Court had conducted an economic analysis in order to reveal importance 
of online sales freedom. 
In the meantime, the decision must not be considered regardless of 
competition policy and economic situation in the European Union as whole. The goal 
of European integration, including market integration, is enshrined into the TFEU. 
The decision that permits ban on online sales might mitigate the role of Internet 
distribution not only in EU scale, but also on national markets, hence, partly 
eliminating the new innovative distribution channel from the market. Besides, the 
case law of the ECJ demonstrates a tendency to correct the imperfections made in 
earlier judgements. Since there are variety of products and distribution modes on the 
market, online sales treatment can be possibly changed for extraordinary situations. 
Moreover, the Court clearly stated that ban on Internet sales can absolutely benefit 
from individual exemption under article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore, the decision is 
rather strict, though is necessary in order to ensure economic needs of the European 
Union. 
4.2.3 Restriction by Object 
 As it is already clear the case did not lack political motivation. In this regard, 
it seems that the referring court formulated the question for a preliminary ruling in a 
very convenient for the ECJ way. Instead of quite typical question whether this or that 
clause violates article 101 (1) TFEU, the French court asked directly if the ban on 
Internet sales constitutes a restriction by object. 
 Concept of restriction by object is only one of the examples of application of 
the rule of reason77. In order to increase procedural efficiency it is reasonable to treat 
certain restrictions as restrictions, which always under any circumstances have 
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anticompetitive effect, i.e. restrictions by object, provided that the experience and the 
case law have proven that. In this consideration, such restrictions as price-fixing, 
market-sharing and territorial restrictions (with some exceptions) apparently have 
negative effects on the competition on the market, while ban on Internet sales could 
produce positive effects as well. Referring to the already mentioned argument of the 
French Government, it is worth noting that the Court has no practice on the ban on 
online selling and, furthermore, such a ban may cause increase of inter-brand 
competition on the market. 
Furthermore, in the Consten and Grundig case 78  the ECJ rejected the 
Commission’s argument that “an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must be 
considered by its nature, that is to say, independently of any competitive analysis, to 
have as its object the restriction of competition”79. Alternatively, the Court conducted 
a competitive analysis80, which confirmed that the agreement at issue aimed to restrict 
competition at the wholesale level by charging prices that were sheltered from 
effective competition. Consequently, before declaring that restrictions on parallel 
trade are restrictions by object the ECJ had assessed their possible effects on the 
competition on the market. 
Similarly, the presumption of anticompetitive effect per se should not have 
been applicable in the Pierre Fabre case without caring out of a competitive analysis 
in order to find out if a general and absolute ban negatively influences effective 
competition on the market.  
4.2.4 Objective Justification 
In spite of overall strict approach to the case, the ECJ has introduced the new 
rule81. Thus, when discussing selective distribution agreements, the Court stated, 
“such agreements are to be considered, in absence of objective justification, as 
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‘restriction by object’”82. The same idea was repeated in the operative part of the 
judgement, which stated that, “a contractual clause… amounts to a restriction by 
object… where… it is apparent that… that clause is not objectively justified”83. In its 
previous case law the ECJ never referred to the objective justification in the context 
of restrictions by object. The AEG Telefunken judgement speaks of legitimate 
requirements, “which may justify a reduction of price competition in favour of 
competition relating to factors other than price” and a legitimate goal84. In the 
GlaxoSmithKline case the Court emphasised that, “in order to assess the anti-
competitive nature of an agreement, regard must be had inter alia to… the economic 
and legal context of which it forms a part”85. Therefore, the explicit possibility to 
objectively justify a restriction by object and, hence, to escape prohibition of article 
101(1) TFEU was introduced in Pierre Fabre. 
As it follows from the opinion of Advocate General and has been mentioned 
above, the French Competition Authority and the Commission adhere to the narrow 
interpretation of objective justification that practically gives no chance to distribution 
agreements for products, selling of which is not covered by EU or national regulatory 
documents. Advocate General’s point of view is more liberal, as he acknowledges 
that the nature of goods or customers to whom they are sold could appear an objective 
justification. The relevant example, perhaps, has already been found; thus, it could be 
“high quality made-to-measure clothing franchise, where there is the practical need 
for an expert to take accurate measurements, combined with the image connected with 
skilled and personalised service” 86. 
Summing up, the ECJ has left the door open only to those companies, products 
of which cannot be sold online due to public health and safety reasons, and in very 
exceptional circumstances to companies that are able to prove that online sales of 
their products would completely ruin their reputation and, maybe, business. 
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4.2.5 Free Movement or Competition 
The structure and the reasoning of the Pierre Fabre case resemble more a 
judgement on free movement of goods, rather than competition law. The ECJ seemed 
to use the so called ‘proportionality test’ referring to such terminology as ‘necessity’, 
‘proportionality’ and ‘objective justification’87. Actually the Court directly declared, 
that it did not accept the arguments of Pierre Fabre relating to the need of individual 
advice and proper use of the product “in the light of the freedoms of movement”88. 
It should be noted that free movement of goods and competition cases are 
quite similar in their reasoning. Free movement of goods cases consist of deciding if 
the practice in question constitutes a restriction and, if so, of assessing suitability, 
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu in order to justify such restriction. 
Competition cases as a rule also detect a restriction on competition that may be 
exempted. Hence, both approaches pursue elimination of obstacles to internal market 
and fair trade development, when permitting practices, which are restrictive, though 
justified. 
In this light the Pierre Fabre decision can be compared with the Ker-Optika 
judgement89. In that case Hungarian national legislation allow selling contact lenses 
only in specialised shops, which also constitutes de facto ban on Internet selling, since 
consumers aiming to purchase contact lenses must be provided with medical advice in 
order to prevent health risks. The referring court asked inter alia if the principle of 
free movement of goods precludes such provision of national legislation. Summing 
up, in Ker-Optika a ban on online sales appeared as a restriction to customers from 
other Member States to make purchases via the Internet, while in Pierre Fabre it 
prevented distributors to operate online shops, thus, reducing competition. 
Possible justification claimed by Pierre Fabre is the need to provide individual 
advice to the customer and to ensure his protection against the incorrect use of 
products. It shall be reminded that Pierre Fabre products were not medical products; 
hence, the requirement of pharmacist advice absolutely could not be equal to medical 
practitioner’s advice or prescription. In Ker-Optika Hungarian Government relied on 
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the need to ensure protection of the health of contact lens users90. The proportionality 
test carried out by the ECJ indicated that the request to sell contact lenses only in 
shops which specialise in the sale of medical devices is appropriate for securing the 
attainment of the objective pursued.  However, it goes beyond what is necessary, 
since ophthalmologist’s precautionary examinations or medical advice are not 
inseparable from the purchase itself. Thus, undergoing of such examinations is 
primarily the responsibility of each contact lens user, while the optician is responsible 
for merely advising91. Moreover, advising services are required only when contact 
lenses are first supplied, since the following purchases are made on the basis of 
previous experience. And, finally, advising services can also be provided via the 
Internet. 
In order to assess the Court’s position in applying free movement of goods 
outcomes when deciding the Pierre Fabre case, it is necessary to find out if its 
findings in Ker-Optika are relevant for the situation at issue. 
Firstly, taking into consideration that risks of incorrect use of contact lenses 
are significantly more serious that those of skin cosmetics, the Court’s findings in 
Ker-Optika are absolutely relevant for the Pierre Fabre case from the public health 
point of view. Therefore, the need in individual advice cannot justify the ban on 
online sales. It should be emphasised that consumers should also be responsible for 
the product’s choice, otherwise, it would be risky to sell any personal care products, 
that might cause allergic reactions or related effects, without medical advice. 
Secondly, it is worth noting that besides restricting free movement of goods, 
the Hungarian legislation in fact influenced competition on the market as well. By 
requiring selling products in physical outlets and limiting the area of sales to the 
territory where physical shops operate, it precluded companies from lowering prices 
and entering new geographical markets via Internet, hence, reducing competition (on) 
the market. Therefore, the ECJ’s decision under article 34 TFEU was reasonable and 
needed both in terms of free movement of goods and ensuring effective competition. 
Finally, the scale of the prohibition must not be ignored. Thus, when the 
Member State issues a rule de facto prohibiting online sales it inevitably covers all the 
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distributors of the particular product within this Member State. Moreover, this creates 
a problem of market foreclosure for retailers, which are not able to operate brick and 
mortar shops. Such practice distorts competition as it prevents distributors from 
performing on other geographical markets, requires them to provide excessive 
services and forecloses pure Internet players. Consequently, all these factors taken 
together significantly diminish consumer welfare, since they do not contribute into 
reducing the price level, improving quality and innovations, though force dealers to 
charge customers for services, they might not enjoy. 
The ban on online sales from the part of a dominant undertaking might cause 
the same negative effects on consumer welfare as it has been mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, this situation does not preclude every distributor from selling online, 
but concerns the distributors of the dominant company. The other distributors can, on 
the contrary, operate online shops and, subsequently, facilitate competition among 
each other and the dominant company by offering lower prices in the Internet and by 
entering new geographical markets. Therefore, the market would not be foreclosed as 
in the case with the Member State’s prohibition; hence, the negative impact on 
consumer welfare would not be necessarily present.  
De facto prohibition on Internet sales coming from the part of the sole 
manufacturer influences merely dealers within its distribution network (and possibly 
limited amount of pure-players) and aims to ensure appropriate performance of the 
company. Unless there is cumulative effect on the market, the ban on Internet sales 
may enhance brand image of the manufacturer, contribute into the services level etc., 
hence, improving the manufacturer’s reputation and facilitating inter-brand 
competition as a result creating benefits for consumers. 
In that regard, the Pierre Fabre situation shall not be treated as equal to the one 
in Ker-Optika. Thus, the Pierre Fabre case concerns selective distribution system. Its 
restrictive effects are proven to be overweight by pro-competitive effects, otherwise, 
it would not be allowed under competition law. Thus, selective distribution aims to 
ensure the luxury image of goods and its proper perception by consumers. 
Consequently, here the requirement of pharmacist’s presence is apparently aimed to 
prevent the problem of ‘bad experience’ and to the fact of providing high-class 
services itself. 
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As a result, deciding the case, where a sole company imposes ban on online 
sales, similarly to the one with the same prohibition from the part of the whole 
Member State, the Court neglected the scale of the matter, market situation and 
especially specifics of selective distribution mode and its overall pro-competitive 
nature. 
Summing up, the free movement of goods experience can be helpful when 
deciding competition cases, though special features of organizing distribution 
channels must be also taken into consideration. 
4.2.6 Legitimate Aim 
The Court findings regarding the legitimacy of the aim to safeguard a 
prestigious image of the product are contradictory to the previous case law. 
In the Copad v. Dior case, which Pierre Fabre referred to, Christian Dior 
concluded a trademark license agreement with Société industrielle lingerie (SIL) in 
order to allow the latter manufacturing and selling luxury corsetry goods labelled 
Christian Dior. The agreement contained the clause prohibiting SIL to sell the 
products to discount stores, as it would affect trademark reputation and luxury status. 
However, due to financial difficulties SIL sold Dior products to Copad, a discount 
network. Despite this case concerns trademark infringement, the Court’s reasoning 
explicitly states that, “since luxury goods are high-class goods, the aura of luxury 
emanating from them is essential in that it enables consumers to distinguish them 
from similar goods”92 and, therefore, appearance of these goods in discount stores 
“damages the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an aura of 
luxury”93. 
In the Leclerc judgement94 Galec, the network of supermarkets, opposed the 
proposed Commission Decision to grant an exemption to Yves Saint Laurent selective 
distribution system. In Galec’s view, its supermarkets were adapted to sale of luxury 
products, particularly, cosmetics, however, the YSL company set impossibly high 
selective criteria. The Court of First Instance analysed the situation very carefully 
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and, finally, came to the conclusion that selective criteria of YSL met the conditions 
for the exemption95 and emphasised that, “criteria aimed at ensuring that the products 
are presented in retail outlets in a manner which is in keeping with their luxury nature 
constitute a legitimate requirement of such a kind as to enhance competition in the 
interests of consumers”96. 
On the contrary, the aim of maintaining prestigious image was not treated as a 
legitimate aim for restricting competition in the context of article 101(1) TFEU97. In 
this regard, the Court’s finding is ambiguous. The main paragraph of interest, 
paragraph 46, is not supported by any references to the previous case law and no 
explanation is provided why the Court considered so. 
Some authors doubt if “the ECJ does indeed mean that the aim of preserving a 
luxury image is not a sufficient justification for using a selective distribution at all” 98. 
Such opinion seems legit, since otherwise the Court has overruled its well-established 
case law. On the other hand, if the Court assessed the ban on Internet sales in isolation 
from the selective distribution context and recognised the aim of maintaining 
prestigious image as not legitimate only for prohibition of online sales, then such 
finding, in spite of reference to article 101(1) TFEU, resembles the situation, where 
the ban on Internet sales constitutes a disproportionate measure in the light of free 
movement of goods, as discussed before. 
Thus, the Court, perhaps, went too far in its desire to absolutely prohibit bans 
on online selling. The lack of motivation and inconsistent reasoning reveal the 
political grounds of the case. In order to prevent Pierre Fabre from ‘outright ban’, the 
ECJ might accept that the need in professional advise and, moreover, the aim of 
safeguarding the brand image were legitimate, though stating that the criterion, 
namely the ban on Internet sales, goes beyond what is necessary99. However, this line 
of reasoning could hardly help in declaring the ban on online sales a restriction by 
object. 
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Two judgements presented above, along with many others, prove that the 
Court and the Commission have always understood the specifics of luxury market 
until the present Internet distribution age. Indeed, selling products through discount 
stores is comparable and even close to selling via the Internet in the context of luxury 
goods. The Court and the Commission also acknowledge that the physical 
presentation of luxury products contributes a lot into maintaining brand image and 
could be a decisive factor for a customer in his or her choice. Nevertheless, only 
future case law is able to demonstrate the very sense of paragraph 46. 
4.3 After-Fabre Experience 
The application of Pierre Fabre doctrine in practice can be seen in the Bang & 
Olusfen case100 recently decided by the French Competition Authority. 
4.3.1 Factual Background and Decision 
Bang & Olufsen France is a subsidiary of a Danish manufacturer of high-
quality audio and video products Bang & Olufsen A/S. The French company has a 
network consisting of 48 distributors in the territory of France. The agreement at issue 
was drawn up in 1989 and contained a clause prohibiting distance sales. Certainly, no 
reference was made to Internet selling, as at that time it was not developed and not 
considered as a separate distribution channel. In 2000 Bang & Olufsen sent a circular 
to all its dealers, which inter alia stated that certain category of the distributors could 
apply for an own page on the global website, however, they must be approved by 
Bang & Olufsen. According to the circular, such webpage could not contain any 
information concerning the dealer’s activity, excepting its status of authorised 
distributor and ability to advise on the goods at its physical outlet. Moreover, in case 
the retailers operate their own websites, they are prohibited to use logos and 
trademarks of Bang & Olufsen. 
In the French Competition Authority’s view, the agreement and the circular 
contain de facto prohibition on online sales. The Bang & Olufsen global website has 
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no reference to Internet sales; and the prohibition to use manufacturers’ logos and 
trademarks makes online sales via the distributors’ websites “materially 
impossible”101. Thus, prohibition of online sales reduces intra-brand competition 
among distributors and deprives potential customers, who live far from the outlets, of 
ability to buy products. 
Referring to the Pierre Fabre judgement, the French Competition Authority 
ruled that the clause in a selective distribution agreement containing de facto ban on 
Internet sales, such as one at issue, constitutes a restriction by object, unless that 
clause is objectively justified. 
In its decision from 12 December 2012 the Authority imposed a fine of 
€ 900,000 on Bang & Olufsen and ordered to amend the selective distribution system 
within three months in order to allow distributors selling online. When determining 
the amount of the fine the Authority took into consideration the gravity and duration 
of the infringement, but at the same time admitted that the harm to the economy was 
very limited, as only a small number of consumers could have been affected102. Bang 
& Olufsen appealed the Decision, hence, now the case is pending before the Paris 
Court of Appeal. 
4.3.2 Argumentation for Appeal 
It is clear from the Pierre Fabre case that Bang & Olufsen has no chance to 
justify its clause. Like it has been discussed above, justification can be found only in 
mandatory provisions of EU or national law, regulating certain product markets, and 
in very exceptional situations, where online sales would ‘destroy’ the product’s 
quality and image. Obviously, selling of audio systems cannot concern public safety 
and health issues and has no special treatment from the part of EU. It is pointless to 
provide arguments for maintaining prestigious brand image, since this aim is not 
considered as a ‘legitimate aim’ in accordance with the Pierre Fabre judgement. The 
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need of individual advice and proper use of the product can hardly be claimed as well. 
The only reasonable argument seems to be a technical complexity of goods 
concerned. When installing audio/video system, every part of it contributes a lot into 
the final image or sound. Hence, certain types of acoustic systems necessitate 
appropriate cables and sockets. The wrong cable can significantly diminish the quality 
of sound even if the most innovative and expensive speaker is used. Without going 
deeply into details, it should be noticed that all the parts of acoustic system shall 
match each other and, most probably, an average consumer is not able to make an 
optimal choice on his/her own. However, in this regard the distributors of Bang & 
Olufsen could provide the guidelines on products’ compatibility on the website and 
offer online consultations. 
Therefore, the ban on Internet sales is apparently not proportionate in this case 
and one could hardly believe that this distribution system can satisfy requirements of 
article 101(3) TFEU. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to take a look at Bang & 
Olufsen argumentation. 
4.3.3 Being Reasonable 
It is worth mentioning that improvement of availability of products and 
consumers’ choice is definitely one of the aims in nowadays competition law and 
practice. When fitting every company under the same rule, competition authorities 
should not, however, go beyond what is reasonable. 
In the Pierre Fabre case intra-brand competition on the market was really 
strong due to the number of authorised outlets. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that 
anybody interested in the product lacks it because of absence of the physical retailer, 
since 23,000 outlets can absolutely cover the territory of France even if the product at 
issue is of monthly-need. 
Bang & Olufsen selective distribution network has just 48 dealers. However, 
the products concerned cannot be treated as household appliances that, generally 
speaking, should be available everywhere. Bang & Olufsen acoustic systems can be 
used in concert halls, galleries, and clubs; hence, they are very expensive and are not 
demanded by most people. The company also produces home theatre audio systems 
and even small devices, such as earphones and computer speakers; however, it is 
absolutely not the leading product line. Therefore, it appears reasonable that potential 
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customers could drive to the nearest outlet in order to buy a home acoustic system 
once in 5-10 years. 
It would be fair to say that such factors should also influence a decision at 
least when determining the amount of fine. 
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5 Conclusion 
As it has been stated in the beginning, the purpose of this thesis is to examine 
the relevant documents, such as the VBER and the Guidelines, and the case law in 
order to reveal the existing status of online sales, particularly in the context of 
selective distribution, its benefits, drawbacks and possible development. 
Thus, every amendment to the VBER and the Guidelines that concerns online 
sales has been discussed in detail. The research has demonstrated that the current 
regulatory documents are not perfect and need further development. Particularly, the 
Commission might underestimate the power of Internet selling and considers it as 
passive sales in the Guidelines, while doctrinal studies and even national competition 
authorities103 admit that online selling constitutes a new alternative distribution 
channel. Other novelties reveal the Commission’s ambiguous position towards online 
sales. For instance, the Commission acknowledges specific needs of ‘selective’ 
manufacturers and grants the right to require distributors to operate at least one 
physical outlet, while offering inconsistent solutions concerning dual price policy and 
prohibiting liming proportion of online sales. Further, the Guidelines allow 
distributors imposing quality criteria on online retailers. However, such right reflects 
the very sense of selective distribution and introduces nothing more as a new hardcore 
restriction, in case criteria for online stores are not equivalent to those for physical 
outlets. Nevertheless, since the VBER with the accompanying Guidelines of 2010 are 
the first documents regulating online distribution, there is a hope that their 
imperfections will be corrected in the future by new amendments or by case law 
interpretation. 
Consequently, the current approach shall be reconsidered in order to keep step 
with the Internet and technology development. Further development of EU 
competition law shall emanate from the assumption that the Internet is not a 
complementary way of selling goods, though an independent distribution channel. 
Thus, the rules on Internet selling regulating different distribution modes must be 
adapted to the nature and the sense of such modes with regard to previous case law 
and especially to economic considerations. In particular, special attention shall be 
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paid to far-reaching activities of online stores, their limited capacity in providing 
services and product presentation and their overall virtual nature in order to prevent 
reduced quality of goods, trade mark erosion and other negative impacts, which could 
result in diminishing of consumer welfare. 
The main problem nowadays seems to be a tacit conflict between political 
needs and economic rationality in competition sphere. The big aim of establishing the 
single market, inter alia by means of online sales, to some extent neglects economic 
reasons as it follows from the discussed case law. The Commission and the Court’s 
attempt to fit every type of agreement under the single ‘online rule’ does not reflect 
the reality. Since in fact the Internet is a new channel of selling, the distinctive 
requirements shall be adopted for different distribution systems. Thus, a reasonable 
balance shall be found between a need of separate markets integration and 
manufacturers’ need to independently determine their trading policy, otherwise, 
preponderance of either necessity might negatively influence consumers by 
undermining producers’ incentives for research and development or by markets 
isolation respectively.  
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